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Democracy and Statehood
Veronika Fikfak 

Abstract
This Essay addresses the relationship between democracy and statehood. The two concepts
have been linked since the 1990s, when new entities claiming statehood were expected to have
constituted themselves on a democratic basis and to have put in place democratic government
structures to be recognized by the international community. Yet, as Professor Tom Ginsburg’s
book Democracies and International Law reveals, the rise of autocracies and a general
backlash against democracy in the last three decades have led to changes in countries’ behavior.
This Essay argues that today, the requirement of democratic process and institutions for
international recognition is less stringent. Even more, it posits that if autocracies team up to
recognize other similarly non-democratic entities, democracy might play no role in the formation
of new states in the long run. In this regard, Democracies and International Law may
signal an end to the 1990s European approach to recognition and be an indication of a new
reality in the area of statehood.



iCourts, Centre of Excellence, University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law. This research is funded
by the Danish National Research Foundation Grant no. DNRF105 and conducted under the
auspices of iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation’s Centre of Excellence for
International Courts.

103

Chicago Journal of International Law

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 105
II. Democracy as a Condition of Statehood? ....................................................... 106
III. Democracy and the Right to Remedial Secession ......................................... 110
IV. Revisiting the Democracy and Statehood Link ............................................. 112
V. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 115

104

Vol. 23 No. 1

Democracy and Statehood

Fikfak

I. I NTRODU C TION
In his new book, Democracies and International Law,1 Professor Tom Ginsburg
asks, “What is the relationship between democracy and international law?” His
book demonstrates—through an incredibly careful and rich empirical analysis—
whether, how, and why democracies behave differently than non-democracies in
their use of international legal institutions. Ginsburg reveals that democracies are
the driving force behind international lawmaking, in that they use international
law as a mechanism of cooperation much more than do countries with other
forms of government, such as autocracies.2 In particular, he notes that
democracies accept more precise treaty obligations,3 are more likely to become
members of international organizations,4 and are less likely to include dispute
resolution clauses in bilateral agreements.5
Ginsburg then reverses his initial question and asks whether international
law can be used to protect democracy.6 Noting the developments after the Cold
War, when international institutions like the European Court of Human Rights
and the European Court of Justice helped to promote the development of
democratic institutions within their member states by offering guidance and
individual protections via their adjudicatory systems, Ginsburg notes that
international law can reinforce democracy. Nonetheless, he also finds that the
international environment is quite different today than it was at the end of the
Cold War. Important developments have taken place in the last thirty years, and
the contention that international institutions can successfully intervene to
confront democratic backsliding is now in question. As Ginsburg highlights, the
record on this is a mixed bag.7
This Essay will examine an aspect of the relationship between democracy
and international law that is (intentionally)8 not addressed in Ginsburg’s book: that
of the relationship between democracy and statehood. This question deserves
attention, as the two concepts have been inextricably linked since the 1990s, when
new entities claiming statehood were expected to have constituted themselves on
a democratic basis and to have put in place democratic government structures.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2021).
See id. at 62–68.
See id. at 67.
See id.
See id.
See id. at ch. 3, 4.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 16.
See Declaration on the “Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union” at 4 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/23293 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter E.C. Guidelines].
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At that time, in order for an emerging entity to be considered a state and to receive
recognition from other states, it had to show its democratic credentials. In this
regard, democracy was linked to international law in relation to the foremost
question of international law: the birth of new states.
But as Ginsburg shows, enthusiasm for democracy has waned since the
1990s, and autocracies are ever more prevalent and more present on the
international plane. This rise of autocracies threatens to spoil the current status
quo, in which international law and democracy go hand in hand and mutually
reinforce each other. Authoritarian regimes use international law to actively
cooperate with each other in ways that help them remain in power, including
through intervention in other jurisdictions to preserve authoritarian rule.10 From
the perspective of potential new entities making claims for statehood, this means
that recognition by democracies (presumably conditioned on the new entity’s
democratic character) is no longer essential for their survival. If autocracies step
in and provide new entities with recognition and a viable chance to survive by
fostering diplomatic and economic relationships with them, then the democratic
requirements that appeared to be the sine qua non for new entities desiring
recognition may no longer hold.
This Essay proceeds in the following manner. Section II introduces the
expectation that new entities claiming statehood in the 1990s needed to be
democratic and constitute themselves on a democratic basis. Section III describes
perhaps the clearest link between democracy and statehood, the example of
remedial secession. Section IV then asks whether the requirement of a democratic
process is still a relevant condition for statehood today. Specifically, it discusses
whether entities are still required to show democratic credentials before being
recognized. It also looks to the latest caselaw of international organizations,
especially in Europe, to consider what is required of states once they become
members of international organizations and how this might be relevant for
statehood. Section V concludes.

II. D E MOC RAC Y AS A C ONDITION OF S TATE HOOD ?
At the end of the Cold War, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the communist social and
political economic order had come to an end, and a number of new states
emerged. This “entanglement of post-Cold War political developments and the
emergence of new states led to the idea that democracy should be brought into
international law as a normative framework in relation to both existing and

10

See id. at 186–237.
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emerging states.”11 At the time, some international legal scholars argued that
democracy “had become a normative entitlement of all individuals.”12 In this
context, the European Community (E.C.) member states adopted a number of
documents that explicitly expressed their willingness to grant recognition only to
those new states which had constituted themselves on a democratic basis.13
Prior to 1990, there had been no similar requirements. The law of statehood
had previously revolved around the Montevideo Convention criteria (defined
territory, permanent population, existence of a representative government,
capacity to enter into relations with other states)14 and around concepts such as
recognition, secession, and dissolution. As a rule, states had not judged the type
of government or electoral process an entity adopted, nor had they conditioned
recognition upon it. The democratic character of any new entity’s constitution or
institutions was not determinative of successful state creation.15
After the end of the Cold War, however, this perception changed. In
response to the events in the former SFRY and the Soviet Union, and the
subsequent dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the E.C. issued a set of guidelines for
recognition of new states emerging in these two territories, which stated:
Member States affirm their readiness to recognize those new States which,
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on
a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations
and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to
negotiations.16

The language of democracy therefore entered any discussion of the birth of
a new state. To be recognized, a new entity had to have two basic things: (1)
“democratic procedure” (alteration of its legal status in accordance with the will
11

12

13

14

15

16

JURE VIDMAR, DEMOCRATIC STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
STATES IN POST-COLD WAR PRACTICE 1 (2013).
See generally Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
Thomas Franck, Democracy as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY (L. Henkin & J. Hargrove eds., 1994); Thomas Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic
Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R.
Roth eds., 2001); Fernando Téson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53
(1992); FERNANDO TÉSON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFS. 183 (1997).
See E.C. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 4 ¶ 3.
See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, https://perma.cc/98UX-BZ8F.
See generally J.E.S. Fawcett, Security Council Resolution on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 104, 112
(1965–66); D.J. Devine, The Requirements of Statehood Re-examined, 34 MODERN L. REV. 410, 410–17
(1971) (including a description of Fawcett’s response); Eur. Council, Declaration on Yugoslavia and
on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting,
Brussels, Dec.16, 1991), quoted in 1992 I.L.M. 1485, 1485.
E.C. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 4 ¶ 3.
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of the people) and (2) “democratic government structures” (adherence to a
particular political system).17 The E.U. adopted this approach for entities in
Europe, including Montenegro and Kosovo, as well as outside of Europe, like
Eritrea, Ethiopia, East Timor, and South Sudan.18
In his seminal study, Democratic Statehood in International Law, Jure Vidmar
shows that most of the states that emerged in the period following the Cold War
were created with the overwhelming support of the will of the people, expressed
in independence referenda.19 They sought international recognition and
membership in international institutions, and they created democratic institutions
within their own borders. But, as Vidmar says, it was unclear whether the new
language of democracy “being used in the discourse of state creation [wa]s still
that of international law.”20 In other words, did international law require democratic
character to accord an entity statehood?
Following the E.C.’s guidelines for recognition of new states, most of the
discussion has revolved around the idea that the requirement for states to
constitute themselves on a democratic basis should be regarded as a recognition
requirement and not a statehood criterion.21 This means that while democratic
procedure was important for the granting of recognition by other states, it was not
crucial for the entity to exist as a state.
This distinction is crucial. While fulfilling the criteria of statehood is essential
for an entity to become a new state, recognition is not necessarily crucial for its
emergence. This is because in international law, there are two theories of the role
recognition plays in relation to statehood. The “declaratory theory” of
recognition, on the one hand, posits that recognition is merely a political act
accepting and recognizing a pre-existing state of affairs22—welcoming an entity
into the international community and showing a willingness to engage with it. In
this context, recognition is merely indicative of the fact that an entity already
exists. The “constitutive theory” of recognition, on the other hand, perceives
recognition as “a necessary act before the recognized entity can enjoy an

17
18
19

20
21

22

JURE VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 2.
See id. at 1.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
See RICHARD CAPLAN, EUROPE AND THE RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES IN YUGOSLAVIA (2005); see
also STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION
COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
WORLD (2000).
See MARTIN DIXON, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE & SARAH WILLIAMS, CASES
INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (2011).
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international personality.”23 From this perspective, international recognition is a
necessary condition for the emergence of new states. In this regard, if democracy
were accepted as a condition of recognition, “a territorial entity which did not
come about in a democratic procedure and which does not seek to establish
democratic government structures would not qualify as a state.”24
Most writers have adopted the declaratory view of recognition.25 They
therefore believe that a “state may exist without being recognized, and if it does
exist, in fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognized by other states,
it has a right to be treated by them as a state.”26 But this view is not straightforward
because, as Vaughan Lowe argues, states depend on other states for their survival:
Recognition is undoubtedly a political instrument. When would-be states
emerge in a non-consensual way from the territory of existing states, whether
it be by attempted secession or by the break-up of the former state, there is
always a time during which it is unclear whether the attempt to establish the
new state will succeed . . . During this period the attitude of third States is
enormously important. If, say, the EU or the USA or Russia announces that
it recognizes the new entity as a state and will give it economic or other
assistance, it is much more likely to survive than if they all say that they will
have nothing to do with it. 27

Recognition by others, and the economic and diplomatic relationships that
come out of that political act, therefore carries with it a great deal of promise for
new entities. As scholars have shown, although “it is often difficult to discern the
precise impact that recognition has upon emergent statehood,” the correlation
between recognition and the survival of a new entity is clear: “nascent political
communities that receive international recognition during their attempts to secede
seem more likely to become independent states than those that do not.”28 How
important recognition is can be seen from the example of unsuccessful attempts
at secession—situations in which recognition did not occur. Consider the
attempted separation of Kantanga from the Democratic Republic of Congo,29 of
23

24

25
26
27
28

29

THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND
EVOLUTION (1999); Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385,
386 (1944).
Anne Peters, Statehood after 1989: “Effectivités” between Legality and Virtuality, in SELECT PROCEEDINGS
OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds.,
2012).
See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (2010).
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138 (1963).
VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (2007).
Alex Green, Successful Secession and the Value of International Recognition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
SECESSION 3 (Lea Raible, Jure Vidmar & Sarah McGibbon eds., 2022).
This attempted separation was not recognized by a single state on the international plane. See JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 405 (2006). See generally Certain
Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962
I.C.J. 151 (Jul. 20).
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Republika Srpska from Bosnia-Herzegovina,30 and of the Republic of Somaliland
from the Federal Republic of Somalia,31 all of which were situations “where the
emergence of independent statehood was universally denied, and no new state
arose.”32
Given how important recognition is to an entity’s survival, conditioning the
act of recognition on democratic credentials cannot easily be ignored. The next
Section turns to an area where the link between the democratic requirement and
the creation of a new state is perhaps most clearly seen: the theory of remedial
secession.

III. D E MOC RAC Y AND T HE R IGHT TO R E ME DIAL S E C E SSION
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked whether a right to
unilateral secession existed in international law in the case Secession of Quebec.33 The
Court held that no such right existed, but it went further, outlining clearly for the
first time the idea of remedial secession:
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to
self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal
self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and
cultural development within a framework of an existing state. A right to
external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of
the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme
of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. 34

The Court went on to explain that such “‘most extreme cases’ were intended
not only for peoples under a colonial rule, but also ‘where a people is subject to
alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context.’”35 In this
context, the Court underlined that a number of commentators had asserted the
right to self-determination may also exist “when a people is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally.”36 In such a
circumstance, as a last resort, it is entitled to exercise self-determination by
secession.
30

This attempted separation was also not recognized by any states on the international plane. The
territory that attempted to separate is now one of two constitutive entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
See USTAV BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE [CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA], Dec. 14, 1995,
art. 1(3).

31

35

See European Court of Auditors, “Special Report No 4/2000 on rehabilitation actions for ACP
countries as an instrument to prepare for normal development aid, accompanied by the
Commission’s replies,” 2000 O.J. (C 113) 14 ¶ 83.
Green, supra note 28, at 2.
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Can.).
Id. ¶ 126.
Id. ¶ 133.

36

Id. ¶ 134.

32
33

34
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In referring to “internal self-determination,” the Canadian Supreme Court
underlined the duty of every state to represent “the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction of any kind.”37 If, for example, definable groups are
blocked from accessing government to pursue their political, economic, social,
and cultural development, this could potentially give rise to a right of secession.38
A group that is persistently denied the ability to exert internally its right to
self-determination “may be acknowledged by the international community to have
a claim-right to repudiate the authority of the state and to attempt to establish its
own independent political unit.”39 In essence, the group may (possibly) be entitled
to a right to external self-determination.40
In the Quebec case, the exceptional circumstances were, of course, not
applicable. The Court underlined that the Quebec people were not an oppressed
people, nor victims of attacks on their physical existence or integrity. They were
also not denied access to democratic institutions or representation in government.
Rather, residents of the province were freely able to make political choices and
pursue economic, social, and cultural development within Quebec, across Canada,
and throughout the world. They were able to take part in a referendum and make
democratic choices about their province.
This position taken by the Supreme Court of Canada suggests that: (1) the
success of a unilateral secession depends on international recognition, and (2) the
conduct of the parent state toward the independence-seeking entity will be
considered very important when states decide on granting recognition. In this
context, the recognizing state will carefully consider whether the
independence-seeking entity enjoys sufficient and appropriate opportunities for
self-government and whether it has access to democratic institutions in a manner
that can shape political decisions. The judgment thus ties the idea of recognition
again with democracy, suggesting that the absence of democratic processes and
institutions can lead to remedial secession, which is given effect through
international recognition of the new entity.41

37

Id. ¶ 136.

38

40

See id. ¶ 138.
JURE VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 335 (citing ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND
SELF-DETERMINATION (2004)).
In literature, support for such a remedial right is very tentative, with terms like “possible” or
“perhaps” regularly attached to the claim. See JAMES SUMMERS, PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HOW NATIONALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION SHAPE A CONTEMPORARY LAW OF NATIONS 347
(2007).

41

See JURE VIDMAR, supra note 11, at 161.

39
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IV. R E VISITING THE D E MOC RAC Y AND S TATEHOOD L INK
The E.C. guidelines for recognition and the Quebec opinion from the
Supreme Court of Canada essentially represent how things stood with respect to
recognition (at least in the E.U.) in the 1990s.42 In light of Ginsburg’s analysis of
changes that have taken place in the last thirty years, however, the question arises
whether the same democratic expectations remain valid for new entities wishing
to become states. Do we have the same expectations of new entities today as we
did in the 1990s?
Scholar Alex Green has, for example, argued that we can no longer expect
new entities to be constituted in a democratic manner, nor indeed insist that they
have democratic institutions, in situations where we make no similar demands of
already existing states.43 Green singles out the fact that the United Nations (U.N.),
the international organization in which membership is most coveted by new
entities, does not require the presence of democratic institutions in an applicant
entity.44 Looking even more closely, states that have no such institutions in their
territory are active members of the U.N. and enjoy universal recognition.45 For
Green, if we accept that U.N. membership is indicative of widespread recognition,
“the presence or absence of democracy in the applicant community is not
determinative of its equal status under international law.”46 Green’s point is that
since the U.N. does not discriminate on the basis of democratic character, states
more broadly are also unlikely to draw such distinctions when deciding whether
to recognize new entities. Although scholars may favor conditioning recognition

42

43

44
45

46

It is important to emphasize that the European approach is not representative of the global view.
The African Union, for example, also influences the recognition practices of its members, but it did
not adopt a similar position during the 1990s. In addition, the inclusion of the democratic
requirement in the E.C. guidelines was not universally accepted, and several states actively opposed
it. Thanks to Alex Green for flagging this. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 150–55 (2006).
See Green, supra note 28, at 8.
See id.
See Sean Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments, 48 INT’L & COMPAR.
L.Q. 545, 556 (1999); Gregory Fox & Bradley Roth, Democracy and International Law, 27 REV. INT’L
STUD. 327, 337 (2001).
While the U.N. Charter frequently uses the word “state” in an idiosyncratic manner—and therefore
sometimes may not entail much for the equal status of the “states” it references—membership
decisions pursuant to Article 4(1) broadly reflect the notion that members must be states under
international law. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11–57 (1963). Note, however, that Jure Vidmar
finds that membership in the U.N. does not always overlap with, and is broader than, statehood
status under general international law. See Jure Vidmar, UN Membership and the Statehood Requirement:
Does ‘State’ Always Imply ‘Statehood’?, in 24 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 201–46 (Erika de Wet, Kathrin
Maria Scherr & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2021).

112

Vol. 23 No. 1

Democracy and Statehood

Fikfak

on democratic credentials, such a rule—according to Green—is currently merely
“emerging”47 and does not fit the reality of international relations.
Green’s conclusion is supported by the classic statement of the International
Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, which
held that:
adherence by a State to any particular [political] doctrine does not constitute
a violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make
nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty on which the
whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political,
social, economic and cultural system of a State. 48

Based on the above considerations, he concludes that “it seems that any
attempt to defend our current practices of international recognition with an appeal
to democracy would be misguided: the putative justification simply does not fit.”49
Green’s hesitance about the democratic nature of statehood may be
reflective of states’ pushback against making various types of demands on new
entities and the dangers of a slippery slope (e.g., if we ask for democracy today,
we shall demand human rights protections tomorrow). But he makes an
interesting point: he argues that in the name of equality, the expectations of new
members should be the same as those demanded of existing members, and not
more. But this also does not reflect reality. When new states joined the Council of
Europe (amongst them Hungary and Poland) in the 1990s and the E.U. in the
2000s, specific demands were made of these entities, including the protection of
human rights consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights, the
harmonization of domestic legislation in accordance with E.U. law, and, above all,
the establishment of democratic institutions, including independent courts and
tribunals. In effect, membership in these organizations was conditional on the
adoption of certain democratic and rule of law standards.
Yet now, more than twenty years later, when the backlash against the rule of
law in Hungary and Poland is clear,50 E.U. institutions remain hesitant to respond
to or sanction these states.51 Even though rule of law and democratic processes
47

Green, supra note 28, at 8. See also Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86AM.
J. INT’L L. 46, 50 (1992); Fox & Roth, supra note 43, at 337. Even this modest claim is undermined
by the apparent halt of global democratization. Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right
to Democratic Governance?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 507 (2011).

48

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1968 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 263 (Nov. 26).
Green, supra note 28, at 8.
See generally Aleksandra Dzięgielewska, A Mimicry of International Law Compliance: How the Abusive
Interpretation of International Norms Serves Poland’s Illiberal Regime, 23 CHI. J. INT’L L. 89 (2022).
Though indeed, the Court of Justice of the E.U. has sanctioned Poland to €1,000,000 per day for
not suspending the application of the provisions of national legislation relating, in particular, to the
areas of jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, in violation of the rule of

49
50

51
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were a condition of membership but are now—at least to a certain extent—no
longer fulfilled, Hungary and Poland remain members of both the Council of
Europe and the E.U. and enjoy a role as active members.52 There appears to be a
distinction, therefore, between how we treat potential new members and how we
treat existing ones. Looking more closely, it is only Russia that has been first
suspended and then later expelled from the Council of Europe: in response to its
2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Committee of Ministers drew a red line that when
use of force is in question, other member states cannot stand by quietly and accept
such behavior.53
What this suggests is that unjustified use of force is the only situation in
which membership may be withdrawn from an existing member state, while
decline of rule of law and democratic principles—at least for the moment—still
remain debatable criteria for withdrawal. A recent judgment of the Court of Justice
of the E.U. confirms this: it found that when it comes to use of the E.U.’s budget,
member states can condition the use of such funds on protection of the rule of
law and democratic principles in the user state—but any such measure must be
strictly limited to the use of E.U. funds and must be strictly proportionate to the
aim pursued. The Court did not find that such a requirement applied outside of
the use of E.U. funds, suggesting that international institutions may be limited in
terms of demands they can or wish to make of their member states.54
What does all of this mean for our case of recognition? It is very hard to say
whether the international community should treat membership in an international
institution as an indication of how states would act when they recognize new
members. Looking at past practice, it is clear that recognition demands more of
new entities wishing to claim statehood than it demands of states who are already
members of the international institution.
The more important question is what the attitude of states around the world
is toward recognition of non-democratic entities. Which entities states recognize
is ultimately a political act and one about which they themselves decide. It is on
this point that Ginsburg’s book is very important. If autocracies are on the rise,
and if they are making use of international law to assist each other, then it could
be expected that in situations where an authoritarian leader wishes to form a new
entity without democratic process or democratic institutions, other authoritarian
law requirements. Case C-204/21, Press and Information Commission v Poland,
ECLI:EU:C:2021:834 (Oct. 6, 2021). The monies owed—already into the €100,000,000 mark—
remain unpaid.
52
53

54

Their compliance with judgments has been drastically affected, though.
See Council of Europe Suspends Russia’s Rights of Representation, COUNCIL EUR. (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://perma.cc/4FTB-BWKN; The Russian Federation Is Excluded from the Council of Europe,
COUNCIL EUR. (Mar. 16, 2022), https://perma.cc/N276-BPNK.
See C-156/21, Hungary v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2022:97 (Feb. 16, 2022); C-157/21,
Poland v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2022:98 (Feb. 16, 2022).
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regimes would step in to provide the entity with the recognition it needs for
survival.55 Although the act of recognition may only be an acknowledgment of the
existence of the state (under the declaratory theory), the reality is that the
international community must observe who states recognize in the future to
understand what the rules are. In order to know what the conditions of
recognition will be, it will therefore be necessary to wait and see what happens
and how democratic and non-democratic states react.

V. C ONC LU SION
By mapping out the changes in how democracies and autocracies behave and
how international law is used either to induce change or perpetuate the status quo,
Ginsburg’s Democracies and International Law reveals how countries’ tolerance or
preferences have changed during the last thirty years. In this context, Ginsburg’s
book may also signal new developments in the area of statehood. Implicitly, his
book suggests the direction in which the law of statehood (and, more specifically,
the practice of international recognition) is likely to turn. It seems to indicate that
if the European approach to recognition in the 1990s was to expect a democratic
process toward statehood and establishment of democratic institutions, today,
such a requirement could be subject to strong backlash. Even more, autocracies
might assist each other and use international recognition to recognize other
similarly non-democratic entities. In this context, in the long run, democracy
might play a lesser role in the future than it has in the past. Of course, to know
what will actually happen in the law of statehood and recognition, the international
community will probably need to wait another thirty years.
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See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 186–237.
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